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CONSTRUCTION OF CHILD LABOR STATUTES.
In the recent case of Louisville H. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Lyon
et al., 159 S. W., 971 (Kentucky), it was held: that the defense
of contributory negligence is not available to the defendant, an
employer, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained by a child of fifteen years, who was .engaged in an em-
ployment prohibited by statute.
This decision, in view of the fact that such statutes are of com-
paratively recent origin, and the adjudications bearing directly on
the point in issue few, is extremely interesting. It is well known
that these laws are the outcome of a great public demand for
legislation against child labor. Let us examine the law as laid
down for their construction.
It has been established as a kule by numerous decisions that the
fact that a defendant is engaged in the violation of a statute will
not preclude him from asserting the defense of contributory neg-
ligence against one who has not exercised the care required by
the circumstances.'
'Browne v. Siegel, Cooper Co., 191 IlL. 226; Gartin v. Meredith, 153
Ind., 16; Nugent v. Vanderveer, 38 Hun. N. Y., 487; Noyes v. Morristown,
1 Vt., 353; Lopes v. Sahuque, 114 La. Ann., 1004.
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This is a general rule of the law of negligence, the English
cases are in accord, 2 and it holds true though the violation of the
statute be negligence per se.3
Then, again, it has been decided that the law of contributory
negligence applies to an infant in the same manner as to an adult,
having due regard to his age and other matters, 4 unless the child
be so young as to be incapable of exercising judgment or discre-
tion.5  So it has been held that the court could not as a matter
of law declare that a child of nine was freed from the duty to
exercise care.6
Under this last general rule the courts have decided that after
the age of seven the child may be chargeable with contributory
negligence 7 and that when the age of fourteen is reached the
infant is presumptively so chargeable.8
These propositions would seem to dispose of the contention of
the case under discussion, and, indeed, the weight of authority is
decidedly adverse to it.'
Recently, however, the courts of three of our-largest states have
manifested a strong dissent from this view. The leading case is
probably that of Marino v. Lehmarier, where the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, by five to two, Judges O'Brien and Gray
dissenting, held that such statutes in effect declared that children
2 Caswell v. Worth, 5 El. & Bl. 949.
3 Platte & Denver C. & M. Co. v. Dowell ct al., 17 Colo., 376; Nickey
v. Steuder, 164 Ind., 189; Willey v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y., 310; Queen v. Day-
ton Coal &' Iron Co., 95 Tenn., 458.
4 Honesberger v. Second Ave. R. R., 2 Abb. Dec. N. Y., 378; Reed v.
Madison, 83 Wis., 171; Schmidt v. Cook, 20 N. Y. Supp., 889; R. R. Co. v.
Gladmon, 15 Wall., 401; Lynch v. Smith, 104 Mass., 52.
5 Pratt v. Brawley, 83 Ala., 371; Ih v. 42d St. Ferry R. R. Co., 47
N. Y., 317; Ludden v. Columbus & Midland R. R. Co., 9 Ohio St. S. & C.
Pl. Dec., 793; Government St. R. R. Co. v. Hanlon, 53 Ala., 70.
6 Ridenhour v. Kansas City R. R. Co., 102 Mo., 270.
7Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo., 178; Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill., 141;
Rohloff v. Fair Haven R..R. Co., 76 Conn., 689.
8 Central R. R. Co. v. Phillips, 91 Ga., 526; Frau enthal v. Laclede Gas
Light Co., 67 Mo. App., 1; Murphy v. Perlstein, 73 N. Y. App. Div., 256.
9 Bergholt v. Auto Body Co., 149 Mich., 14; Treib'ont v. Suffolk Mills
Co., 209 Mass., 489; .Borck v. Michigan Bolt &' Nut Works, 111 Mich., 129;
Smith v. Natl. Coal & Iron Co., 135 Ky., 671; Iron & Wire Co. v. Green,
108 Tenn., 165; Darsam v. Kohlman, 123 La., 164; Rolin v. Tobacco Co.,
141 N. C., 300; Roberts v .Taylor, 31 Ont., 10; Evans v. American Iron &
Tube Co., 42 Fed., 519.
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prohibited to work were to be considered so young that negligence
might not be imputed to them.10 This is certainly reading law into
the statute.
Pennsylvania has also in very recent cases expressly reiterated
the holding that in such actions by children the defense of con-
tributory negligence is not available.-
Illinois has pushed this idea even further. There, in a case
where a child wrongfully employed under the statute, engaged,
not in his work assigned, but of his own volition in other work
which he had been expressly forbidden to do, the defense of con-
tributory negligence to a suit by the child for injuries thus re-
ceived, was disallowed.' 2 The court remarked that the defendant,
having unlawfully employed the child, was bound at his peril to
see that he did not engage in such work. This same court, as
are also the New York and Pennsylvania tribunals, is of the
opinion that to allow the plea of contributory negligence in such
cases would be to defeat the purpose of the statute.1"
What is the purpose of the statute? To prevent child labor.
How is it accomplished? To our minds, in two ways; firstly by
affixing a penalty for its violation, and, secondly, by preventing
the employer from taking advantage of any supposed contractual
rights he might be thought to acquire in dealing with the class
with*which he is prohibited to deal. When the employer is sued
for injuries two defenses ordinarily are available, the doctrine of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. There is a sharp
distinction to be noted between the two, the one arising from the
contract of employment by implication, if you please, and the
other out of the customary relations of man to man.14
Now it is conceded that under such statutes as we are discuss-
ing the defense of assumption of risk by the employee is taken
away," for the employer, as is said by Judge Taft, "cannot con-
10 Marino v. Lehmarier, 173 N. Y., 530.
II Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Co., 218 Pa. St., 311; Sullivan v. Hanover
Cordage Co., 222 Pa. St., 40; Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., Z20
Pa. St., 617.
12 Strafford v. Republic Iron Co., 238 Ill., 371.
13 American Car Co. v. Armentrant, 214 Ill., 509.
'14R. R. Co. v. Baker, 33 C. C. A., 468.
1r Thomas v. Quatermaine, 18 Q. B., 685; Counter v. Couch, 8 Allen
Mass., 436; Schleminer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg R. R. Co., 220
U. S., 590.
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tract himself out of the statute."18  But these statutes are penal
and inhibitory and as such are to be strictly construed. 7
Therefore, the weight of authority in so construing them, and,
rightly, we think, holds with the Massachusetts court in the very
recent and fully considered case of Tremont v. Suffolk Mills Co.,
when it says,. "that such statutes leave.undisturbed any principles
which they do not expressly abrogate and beyond this the ordi-
nary rules of negligence must apply,"" citing numreous cases."
This practically amounts to saying that statutes imposing restric-
tions on the freedom of contract can have no bearing on the torts
of one who happens to have endeavored to evade the statute. In
this form it seems even more evident to us that the legislature
could have had no intention, which is after all the cardinal point
of inquiry,20 and whatever be the rule of construction, to so, affect
the liability of the employer.
These statutes do not, on their face, purport to change the usual
rules of liability between master and servant ;21 indeed, it has been
expressly held that they do not affect the rule of contributory
negligence, though they do the assumption of risk doctrine.22
On logical grounds, if a recovery is to be successfully sought,
there must be a causal connection between the act and the injury.23
This there is not, if there be contributory negligence, for then, in
the eye of the law, the plaintiff causes the injury and not the
defendant.
Why, then, in the case of such laws regarding children, any
more than in the case of other inhibitory laws, read into the
statute that which the legislature did not intend? The legislature
VI Narramore v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 96 Fed., 298.
'7 Betties v. Taylor, 8 Port., 564; Morin v. Newbury, 79 Conn., 338;
Schulte v. Menke, 111 Ill. App., 212; People v. Briggs, 193 N. Y., 457.
I8 Tremont v. Suffolk Mills Co., supra.
19 Taylor v. Carew Mfg. Co., 143 Mass., 470; Schlemmer v. Buffalo,
etc., R. R. Co., supra; Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass., 155; Erdman v. Deer
River Lumber Co., 104 C. C. A., 482; Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co. v.
Norgate, 72 C. C. A., 365.
2 0 Ranson v. State, 19 Conn., 292; Sickles v. Sharp, 13 Johns. N. Y.,
497.
21 Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S., 559; Common-
wealth v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co., 134 Mass., 211.
22 Choctaw & Oklahoma R. R. Co. v. McDade, 191 U. S., 64; Grand v.
R. R. Co., 83 Mich., 564.
23 Nickey v. Steuder, supra.
24 Krause v. Morgan, 53 Ohio St., 26.
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has not expressed itself as dissatisfied with the safeguards thrown
around the liability of children. If they had been so dissatisfied,
they would doubtless have said so. The child is protected without
such interpolations. He is freed from the burden of any contrac-
tual defense, he stands on the same ground as to other defenses as
the courts and law makers have always thought is just and right
that he should stand. Nothing'has been done that intimates a
change of their opinion.
To hold otherwise would be to cast an unjust burden on the
employer. He, indeed, under the minority view, may be the sub-
ject of deceit at the hands of the child and yet liable to him. Thus
the child would be allowed to act wantonly and recklessly, in
defiance of justice. Surely it is better to leave unchanged those
rules which, with due regard for the circumstances, are easy of
application and well understood, than to needlessly overturn them
by a forced statutory construction in the face of what seems right
and equitable.
